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ON THE SUPERSINGULAR GPST ATTACK
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Abstract. We explain why the first Galbraith-Petit-Shani-Ti attack on the Supersingular
Isogeny Diffie-Hellman and the Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation fails in some cases.
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1. Introduction
In 2011, De Feo and Jao [DFJ11] introduced Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH),
a post-quantum key exchange protocol that mimics the Diffie-Hellman protocol in the settings
of isogenies between supersingular curves. In 2014, Jao, De Feo and Plût [DFJP14] built upon
SIDH to obtain a key encapsulation scheme called Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation
(SIKE).
We recently carried out a study of one of the most relevant attacks against SIDH and SIKE,
namely the first attack presented in [GPST16]. We call it the Galbraith-Petit-Shani-Ti attack,
or GPST. It is an active attack where the attacker impersonates one of the two parties and can
recover the static key of the other party in about as many interactions as the number of bits
of the key. We will show in Section 2 that the attack may fail in some precise circumstances.
Preliminaries. For an elliptic curve E defined over a field k, we denote the base point of the
elliptic curve by O and the modular invariant of E by j(E). The invariant is an element of k
that characterizes the k-isomorphism class of E. For P ∈ E(k) rational over k, we denote by
〈P 〉 the subgroup of E(k) generated by P .
The parameters of the SIDH protocol, in the form and notation of [GPST16], are the
following:
• A prime p = 2n3mf − 1, where n,m, f are natural numbers, f is small and 2n ≈ 3m.
• A supersingular elliptic curve E0 defined over Fp2.
• Points PA, QA ∈ E0 which form a basis of E0[2
n] and points PB , QB ∈ E0 which form
a basis of E0[3
m].
We refer the reader to the original paper [GPST16] for the presentation of the attack. We
introduce here the two assumptions that are required for the GPST attack to take place:
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(a) Alice uses a static key (a1, a2). The values a1, a2 are elements of Z/2
nZ, not both
divisible by 2.
(b) The attacker has access to an oracle O such that, if E,E′ denote supersingular elliptic
curves defined over Fp2 and R,S denote any two points on E,
(1) O(E,R, S,E′) =
{
true, if j(E/〈[a1]R+ [a2]S〉) = j(E
′),
false, otherwise.
Such an oracle can be realized in practice by having a mechanism in place that ensures
the two parties obtain the same shared key.
The attacker does not need any additional information, which makes the GPST attack one of
the most powerful attacks known in the literature.
2. Attacking the attack
Alice’s static key (a1, a2) is always equivalent (i.e. it leads to the same key exchange) to a
key of the form (1, α) or (α, 1), where α is again an element of Z/2nZ [GPST16, Lemma 2.1].
Without loss of generality, we may assume we are in the former case.
Each iteration of the GPST attack relies on the following implication, used in the paragraph
First step of the attack of [GPST16]:
(2)
(
j(E/〈T1〉) = j(E/〈T2〉)
)
⇒
(
〈T1〉 = 〈T2〉
)
to recover a single bit of the key. In particular, the oracle query (1) is used to recover whether
〈R′ + αS′〉 is equal to 〈R + αS〉, where R,S,R′, S′ are points on an elliptic curve computed
by the attacker. The points R′ and S′ are chosen such that 〈R′ + αS′〉 = 〈R + αS〉 implies
the i-th bit αi of the key is a zero-bit. Thus, if the oracle returns true, then αi = 0, otherwise
αi = 1.
However, implication (2) is not correct, because there exist pairs of elliptic curves E1, E2
with multiple isogenies between them. Thus, if φ1 and φ2 are distinct cyclic isogenies between
E1 and E2 and K1 and K2 are their respective kernels, we have that E1/K1 is isomorphic to
E1/K2 because they are both isomorphic to E2, but K1 andK2 may not be equal and need not
even be isomorphic. Over Q, a classical example can be found in [Sil94, page 110], namely the
pair (E,E), where E is the curve defined over Q with j(E) = 8000, which is given by the affine
Weierstrass equation y2 = x3 +4x2 +2x. This curve E admits a rational 2-isogeny ϕ to itself
(hence cyclic, and given explicitly in loc. cit.), and one computes j(E/ kerϕ) = 8000 = j(E),
hence E and E/ kerϕ are in fact Q-isomorphic, but clearly kerϕ 6= {O}.
Over a finite field of characteristic p > 0, if one starts with a supersingular elliptic curve
E, then for any prime ℓ 6= p, for any positive integer m and for any cyclic subgroup G of
order ℓm, the elliptic curve E/G will also be supersingular, because there are still no points of
order p on E/G. As there are only finitely many supersingular curves over Fp (see for instance
[Sil86, Theorem 4.1, pages 148-149]), there exist pairs of cyclic groups (G1, G2) where G1 and
G2 are not isomorphic and such that E/G1 is isomorphic to E/G2. This argument is used to
compute the endomorphism ring of supersingular elliptic curves in [Sil86, page 146] (see also
[Hus04, page 267]).
Let us give now a detailed example where the Galbraith-Petit-Shani-Ti attack fails to recover
the private key of a SIDH key exchange.
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Example 1. Let p = 2533 − 1 = 863 be a prime and k be the finite field Fp2, considered as
Fp(β), where β satisfies the quadratic equation β
2 − β + 5 = 0. Let E0 be the supersingular
elliptic curve with affine Weierstrass model y2 = x3 + (531β + 538)x + (720β + 375) over k.
Consider the points
PA = (834β + 726, 642β + 130), QA = (583β + 276, 180β + 854),
PB = (254β + 697, 516β + 268), QB = (753β + 317, 234β + 532).
The points PA, QA form a basis of E0[2
5], and PB , QB form a basis of E0[3
3]. Let Alice’s key
be of the form (1, α), with α = 10 (written in base ten). The value α can also be expressed in
bits as 1010 (written in base two). From now on, by a slight abuse of notation we refer to α
as the key.
Let us now carry on the Galbraith-Petit-Shani-Ti attack. Assume the randomly generated
values b1, b2 are b1 = 1, b2 = 6 (for simplicity, we assume b1 and b2 stay constant across
iterations, but we only need b1 = 1, b2 = 6 in the second round for the attack to fail). Let φA
be the isogeny with kernel KA = 〈PA + [α]QA〉. Then EA = E0/KA has affine Weierstrass
model y2 = x3 + (40β + 535)x + (720β + 768). Let us begin the attack and let φB be the
isogeny with kernel KB = 〈PB + [6]QB〉. Thus EB = E0/KB has affine Weierstrass model
y2 = x3 + 105x + 254. Furthermore, we have
R = φB(PA) = (151β + 257, 594β + 2),
S = φB(QA) = (98β + 386, 286β + 58).
Note that since the degree of φB is coprime with the order of PA and QA, the points R and S
have also order 25.
The first iteration of the attack starts by computing
θ0 =
√
(1 + 24)−1 (mod 25) = 7,
R′0 = [θ0]R = (527β + 129, 700β + 163),
S′0 = [θ0][1 + 2
4]S = (164β + 377, 566β + 641).
It then proceeds by querying the oracle with O(EB , R
′
0, S
′
0, EAB) = EB/〈φA(PB)+[6]φA(QB)〉.
The curve EAB : y
2 = x3+698x+(516β+605) has j-invariant 117. The curve EB/〈R
′
0+[α]S
′
0〉
also has j-invariant 117, thus the oracle response is true and the first (rightmost) bit of the
key is a zero-bit. Hence the attack correctly obtains the first bit of the key.
For the second round, the attacker computes
θ1 =
√
(1 + 23)−1 (mod 25) = 5,
R′1 = [θ1]R = (97β + 261, 795β + 545),
S′1 = [θ1][1 + 2
3]S = (718β + 214, 450β + 844),
and queries the oracle on O(EB , R
′
1, S
′
1, EAB). As before, the curves EAB and EB/〈R
′
1 +
[α]S′1〉 both have j-invariant 117, thus the oracle responds true. Hence this time the attacker
incorrectly deduces the second bit (reading from right to left) of the key to be zero.
Brute-forcing the remaining bits does not yield any solution, since there is no key α ending
with two zero-bits (00) such that E0/〈PA + [α]QA〉 is isomorphic to EA.
The previous example establishes that there exist cases where the attack fails. The following
are sufficient conditions (when considered together) for the attack to fail at the i-th iteration
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of the attack, for 1 ≤ i < n− 3 (the attack brute-forces the last three bits of the key and thus
cannot fail after n− 3):
(i) There exist two distinct isogenies φ1 and φ2 between EB and EAB .
(ii) One has R + [α]S = P1 and R
′
i + [α]S
′
i = P2, where P1 and P2 are generators of the
kernel of φ1 and φ2, respectively.
(iii) The i-th key bit αi is 1.
Determining whether condition (i) is satisfied is computationally hard since it is generally
hard to compute isogenies between two given curves. Moreover, the points P1 and P2 are
dependent on the key α and thus unknown to the attacker. Hence, while the attacker influences
the points P1 and P2 by choosing φB , they cannot know whether his choice of φB would cause
the attack to fail.
Condition (ii) ensures that the attack is taking place in the case where the points R and S
give rise to the isogenies considered in the first condition. Given the points P1, P2, we have{
P1 = R+ [α]S,
P2 = R
′
i + [α]S
′
i = [θi]R+ [θi][α+ αi2
n−i−1]S,
thus [θi]P1 − P2 = [θi][2
n−i−1][αi]S = [θi][2
n−i−1]S (because of condition (iii)). If a θi exists
such that the previous equation is satisfied, then suitable points R and S also exist.
Condition (iii) is necessary because the attack fails by incorrectly deducing a zero-bit instead
of a one-bit.
These conditions appear to be quite rare. If it could be shown that the number of cases
where the attack fails is polylogarithmic in the security parameter, the attacker could simply
retry the attack with different choices of φB until it succeeds. The attack would still be efficient.
Let us add a remark. Each iteration of the attack depends on the previous one since the
modified value R′i of iteration i+1 relies on Ki, whose last bit is obtained in the i
th iteration.
To see how the error propagates, assume the attack fails at iteration i. Thus αi, the i
th bit
of the key, is a one-bit but the attacker deduces it to be a zero-bit. It follows that Ki = Ki−1
for the attacker since prepending zero-bits does not affect the value of K. The attacker then
computes the points
R′i = [θ]R− [θ][2
n−i−1Ki−1]S, S
′
i = [θ][1 + 2
n−i−1]S
and queries the oracle on O(EB , R
′
i, S
′
i, EAB).
Thus, omitting θ since it does not affect the subgroup, we have
〈R′i + [α]S
′
i〉
= 〈R+ [−2n−i−1Ki−1 + α(1 + 2
n−i−1)]S〉
= 〈R+ [α]S + [−2n−i−1Ki−1 + 2
n−i−1(Ki−1 + 2
i−1 + 2iαi + 2
i+1α′)]S〉
= 〈R+ [α]S + [2n−2 + 2n−1αi]S〉
6= 〈R+ [α]S〉,
To see why the the inequality in the last line holds, consider that if the two cyclic subgroups
are the same, their generators must be multiples of each other. Assume then R+[α]S+[2n−2+
2n−1αi]S = [m](R+[α]S). The linear independence of R and S implies that R = [m]R, which
means m ≡ 1 mod 2n. Thus, the equality on S implies that [2n−2 + 2n−1αi]S = O, which is
impossible because αi ∈ {0, 1} and 0 6≡ 2
n−2 6≡ −2n−1 mod 2n . This means that the oracle
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will return false (unless the two subgroups, 〈R+[α]S〉 and 〈R′i+[α]S
′
i〉, give rise again to two
isogenies with isomorphic codomain).
The subsequent iterations further propagate the error and the oracle will respond false to
every further query (unless, again, the isogenies with different kernels have the same codomain,
which is believed to be a rare occurrence). Thus, if the attack fails at the ith iteration, all
the following key bits are deduced to be a one-bit. This allows the attacker to approximately
identify the part of the key that has been correctly deduced and target, with a different choice
of φB , only the remaining part.
3. Sage Implementation
In this section, we report the source code of a SAGE [S+09] implementation that shows the
attack failing in the case detailed in Example 1.
def oracle(E, R, S, Ep):
EAp = E.isogeny(R + alpha*S).codomain()
return EAp.j_invariant() == Ep.j_invariant()
## Performs the GPST attack, assuming that Alice’s key
## is of the form (1, alpha).
def attack(n, m, E0, PA, QA, PB, QB, EA, phiAPB, phiAQB):
K = 0
for i in range(n - 3):
alpha = 0
b1 = 1
b2 = 6
KB = b1*PB + b2*QB
phiB = E0.isogeny(KB)
EB = phiB.codomain()
R = phiB(PA)
S = phiB(QA)
EAB = EA.isogeny(b1*phiAPB + b2*phiAQB).codomain()
FF = IntegerModRing(2^n)
theta = Integer(FF((1 + 2^(n - i - 1))^-1).sqrt())
Rprime = theta * (R - (2^(n - i - 1) * K) * S)
Sprime = theta * (1 + 2^(n - i - 1)) * S
response = oracle(EB, Rprime, Sprime, EAB)
if response == False:
alpha = 1
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K += alpha*2^i
found = False
## Bruteforcing the rest of the key
for i in range(2):
for j in range(2):
for k in range(2):
key = K
key += i*2^(n-3) + j*2^(n-2) + k*2^(n-1)
EAprime = E0.isogeny(PA + key*QA).codomain()
if EAprime.j_invariant() == EA.j_invariant():
solution = (1, key % 2^n)
found = True
break
if found:
return solution
else:
return "Key not found"
## Setup
lA = 2
lB = 3
eA = 5
eB = 3
f = 1
p = lA^eA*lB^eB*f - 1 #p in Primes() returns True
F.<x> = GF(p^2)
# E0: y^2 = x^3 + (531\beta + 538)x + 720\beta + 375
# E0 is supersingular, as shown by E0.is_supersingular()
E0 = EllipticCurve(F, [531*x + 538, 720*x + 375])
PA = E0(834*x + 726, 642*x + 130)
QA = E0(583*x + 276, 180*x + 854) #PA and QA form a basis of E0[2^5]
PB = E0(254*x + 697, 516*x + 268)
QB = E0(753*x + 317, 234*x + 532) #PB and QB form a basis of E0[3^3]
mA = 1
nA = alpha = 10
KA = mA*PA + nA*QA
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phiA = E0.isogeny(KA)
EA = phiA.codomain()
phiAPB = phiA(PB)
phiAQB = phiA(QB)
alphaprime = attack(eA, eB, E0, PA, QA, PB, QB, EA, phiAPB, phiAQB)
print("The key is: %s" % str(alphaprime))
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